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“Americans today are called upon to save no democracy except their own. They are under no 
obligation to anybody except other Americans. Their great function, perhaps their one function, 
in these days of crisis is to demonstrate to all the world that they can make their own democracy 
work and that those who live under its shining aegis can be happy, peaceful, and contented. 
Americans have no mission and no purpose to reform other nations or to alter their pattern. If 
the Germans want naziism let them have it. If the Russians like communism or the Italians prefer 
fascism that is their privilege. If the Japanese think they fare best under army rule who are we to 
tell them that they are misguided?” 
 Wilmington (Del.) Journal-Every Evening, September 20, 1939 




“Our boy, while he measures 6 ft. 1 in. in height and weighs 192 pounds, is not yet 21 years of 
age. He is full of hope for the future and all he wants is to be let alone so that he may work out 
his own destiny, as we had a chance to do and as he has every reason to expect. […] 
 
Jack will be taught how to salute, and will be hardened that he may march many miles a day 
carrying full equipment. Or he may be taught to fly an airplane and to drop tons of bombs. He 
will be shown just how to put his full weight back of a bayonet’s thrust; to make sure to stab his 
enemy so that his weapon will not be caught in the other fellow’s ribs—and nice things like that. 
 
All these are hard to contemplate during peace times, but events of the past year show us what to 
expect from dictator controlled countries. 
 
Why in the hell does a just God allow Hitler to live?” 
 
 Letter to the editor from Jack Horner, resident of Ocean City, Maryland 




 World War II began in Europe during September of 1939, more than two years before the 
United States would ultimately join the conflict — and the debate over the appropriate role that 
the United State should play in the conflict began well before the official declaration of war. 
Tensions between two major ideological camps defined the contours of public debate. On one 
side were the interventionists, led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who came to believe that 
the United States had an extensive role to play in the war and should actively oppose the threat of 
Nazi Germany. On the other side was a broad, loosely connected coalition of isolationists, who 
believed for various reasons that the United States should stay out of the conflict in Europe.1 
Much of the historical scholarship surrounding the first United States federal election held after 
the outbreak of war, in 1940, focuses on the national race between President Roosevelt and 
Republican challenger Wendell Willkie. The consensus argument is that the two key issues were 
Roosevelt’s desire to escalate American involvement in the war and his unprecedented desire to 
seek a third term in office.2 Little work, however, has been done on federal elections at the state 
level, which would improve our understanding of how both elected officials and the American 
                                                
1 Some key sources: Peter G. Boyle, The Roots of Isolationism: A Case Study (Cambridge Univ 
Press, 1972), Mark L. Chadwin, The Hawks of World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1968), John Chalberg, Isolationism: Opposing Viewpoints, American History Series (San Diego: 
Greenhaven Press, 1995), Justus D. Doenecke, "Non-Interventionism of the Left: The Keep America out 
of the War Congress, 1938-41," Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 2 (1977), Walter Johnson, The 
Battle Against Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in 
America, 1935-1941 (Imprint Publications, 1966), Ronald E. Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance : 
American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950, Contributions to the Study of World 
History (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
2 Sources: Susan Dunn, 1940 : FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler--the Election Amid the Storm 
(New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013), Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and 
Wendell Willkie (Urbana,: University of Illinois Press, 1960), Richard Moe, Roosevelt's Second Act : The 
Election of 1940 and the Politics of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Edgar E. Robinson, 
They Voted for Roosevelt; the Presidential Vote, 1932-1944 (Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1947). 
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public viewed the conflict between the interventionist and isolationist impulses at this crucial 
moment in the war. 
 In this thesis, I investigate the foreign policy rhetoric used by candidates in two elections 
to the United States Senate in 1940. First, by examining the history of the 76th Congress on 
legislation related to the war in Europe, I develop a political framework for understanding the 
rhetorical developments that occurred between the outbreak of war and the beginning of the 
electoral campaign. I then apply this framework to the Senate elections themselves. From this 
investigation, I conclude that candidates who could be broadly identified as “internationalist,” by 
the time of the election, had adopted a position of preparedness — the notion that the United 
States should be socially, economically, and militarily prepared to enter the war in Europe, 
although entry into the war was not the goal. Candidates who believed in some degree of 
isolationism, in contrast, framed their position as pro-democratic, attempting to make President 
Roosevelt’s decision to seek a third term evidence of a sinister, anti-democratic plot. These 
rhetorical pivots demonstrate what politicians perceived as an American public fraught with 
contradictory impulses — a fear of both being caught up in foreign entitlements and a fear of 
tyrannical government occupying most of Europe. 
 To support the claims made above, this thesis takes the form of two case studies, closely 
examining two different U.S. Senate races in 1940. When beginning this project, I considered a 
wide variety of criteria in selecting a pair of effective case studies to investigate. First and 
foremost I chose elections that were relatively close — margin of victory under ten percentage 
points — because a more hotly contested election is more likely to produce sharp rhetorical 
differences. It was also important to choose two states where an incumbent was running for 
reelection, in order to have a record from the previous Congress to examine. One incumbent 
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would be chosen to represent the more isolationist side of the 76th Congress, and the other would 
be isolationist. Because geographic differences across the entirety of the United States are far too 
dramatic to grapple with in a paper of this length, I decided to restrict the analysis to two states 
that are in the same region of the country.  
 With this criteria in mind, the two case studies in this thesis will be the elections in New 
York and Delaware.3 The incumbents up for reelection in these races represent the two extreme 
sides in the debate over Europe — isolationist (Delaware’s John Townsend) and interventionist 
(New York’s James Mead). These elections were hotly contested, as the winning candidates 
triumphed by a margin of less than ten percentage points.4 More broadly, these two states share 
geographic, economic, and social similarities that make them ripe for comparison. New York and 
Delaware were among the original 13 colonies and are located in the northeastern part of the 
United States. Their Atlantic coastline and natural harbors created a ripe environment for 
industry and trade. Throughout American history New York City and Wilmington have both 
been crucial centers of shipping activity. 
In New York, incumbent Senator James M. Mead, a Democrat, defeated Bruce Barton, a 
Republican member of the House of Representatives. Mead was a longtime supporter of 
President Roosevelt and an ardent advocate of labor and the New Deal. Accordingly, he quickly 
adopted the rhetoric of preparedness in foreign policy and waged his campaign as an advocate of 
the administration’s position. Barton, a moderate isolationist, centered his electoral strategy 
                                                
3 As an aside, it is worth noting that I am a native of Delaware and am currently studying in New 
York. Though the two elections strongly fit the criteria listed above, my familiarity with these two states 
made them an even more compelling choice for this project. 
4 In New York, James Mead prevailed with 53.26% of the vote to Bruce Barton’s 46.66%, a 
margin of 6.6%. The margin in Delaware was thinner, where the challenger James Tunnell captured 
50.63% of the vote to John Townsend’s 47.3% — a margin of 3.33%. See Michael J. Dubin, United 
States Congressional Elections, 1788-1997 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1998), 540-541. 
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around an attack on President Roosevelt’s claim for a third term, arguing that preparing for the 
war in Europe was little more than a screen for dictatorship. Mead swept to his second term in 
the Senate, recording more than 200,000 more votes than President Roosevelt in New York. 
In contrast, the incumbent in the Delaware Senate race was an isolationist. Two-term 
Senator and longtime politician John Townsend sought a third term, but was defeated by 
Democratic challenger James Tunnell. Rather than focusing on any specific foreign policy 
prescription, Townsend ran a campaign based around his long record of public service, personal 
integrity, and judgment. However, Tunnell used Townsend’s long record of votes in Congress to 
argue — using the preparedness framework — that Townsend weakened the national defense. 
Townsend’s campaign also struggled to overcome the rhetoric of Wendell Willkie, who based 
much of his Presidential campaign on a condemnation of Roosevelt’s claim to a third term. 
Townsend, too, was running for a third term, one the voters of Delaware ultimately chose not to 
give him. 
 The research methodology of this paper is simple. In the first chapter, which details the 
legislative process towards foreign policy in the 76th Congress, I used a number of secondary 
analyses of the specific pieces of legislation at hand, guided by David L. Porter’s thorough 
overview The Seventy-Sixth Congress and World War II. 5 To investigate the two state-level 
campaigns, I focused primarily on contemporary newspaper sources. Examining media outlets is 
beneficial in a number of ways. Firstly, it allows direct access to the words of candidates at 
rallies, speeches, and other public appearances. Secondly, it offers us the reaction of voters and 
other institutions through mechanisms such as letters to the editor, political cartoons, editorials. 
                                                
5 David L. Porter, The Seventy-Sixth Congress and World War II, 1939-1940 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1979). 
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Finally, it offers us a richer look at campaign rhetoric through advertisements placed in these 
papers by candidates and their campaigns. Through an analysis of newspaper coverage from 
September through November of 1940, I am able to construct a nuanced and detailed picture of 
campaign rhetoric in the two statewide elections. These media sources are supplemented in all 
three chapters with evidence from the Congressional Record, which gives us access to even 
more information regarding the positions of the politicians I am examining. 
 
The Preparedness Framework 
 It is important, early on, to define thoroughly what I will be referring to as the 
“preparedness framework.” Broadly speaking, the foreign policy perspectives in the United 
States between the First and Second World Wars can be divided into two major groups, 
isolationists and internationalists. Isolationism is a long-existing thread of American political 
thought, which holds that the United States should stay out of entanglements with foreign 
nations. As ideological support for their position, isolationists might point to George 
Washington’s farewell address in 1796, where he argued that the fledgling nation should avoid 
alliances or other agreements with European powers and consequently forge our own destiny, as 
support for this position.6 Generally isolationists wanted the United States to stay out of World 
War I, advocated opposition to the League of Nations, and believed that a strict policy of 
neutrality towards conflicts in Europe was the best path for American foreign policy. 
 Interventionists covered a much more ideologically diverse group of perspectives. These 
people generally believed that the United States should take active steps to prevent conflicts in 
                                                
6 Online text available at “Washington’s Farewell Address,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law 
School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. 
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Europe — or, when these did not succeed, to intervene in conflicts to defend American 
principles such as democracy or a nation’s right to self-determination. The sub-threads of 
interventionism covered within this broad term were various; they may include people otherwise 
referred to as liberals, anti-Communists or anti-Fascists, internationalists (who supported 
concepts such as international law of the League of Nations), or imperialists.  
 The “preparedness advocate” could be seen as one of these sub-threads. More accurately, 
it is a rhetorical position used to justify intervention. An interventionist would believe that the 
United States should take active steps to assist certain countries in other parts of the world, such 
as in the case of aid to Finland following invasion by the Soviet Union in the winter of 1939. A 
preparedness advocate, in contrast, would argue that the United States should be prepared to 
assist other countries — or, centrally, to defend themselves. These distinctions are, to an extent, 
two sides of the same coin. Certainly an interventionist would be more inclined to support 
something like military expansion or the open sale of arms to nations involved in a conflict, as it 
would improve the U.S.’s position to make an intervention, though not all interventionists 
supported every measure that fell under the banner of preparedness. 
 In the first chapter, I trace the evolution of the preparedness framework through the three 
major pieces of legislation related to foreign policy in the 76th Congress (1939-1940). The first 
bill, a revision to the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, introduced preparedness to the political 
discussion. President Roosevelt initially viewed it as a way to unite the nation, and other 
interventionists saw how it could present intervention in Europe in a way that was much more 
palatable to public opinion. The second bill, which authorized aid to Finland, demonstrated the 
limits of the preparedness framework, as interventionists were largely stymied in their attempts 
to provide substantive aid to the Finns. Finally, a bill which established the peacetime draft 
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represented “the triumph of preparedness,” to borrow a phrase from Porter. 7 A concept that had 
never before been seen in America was pushed through the Senate in large part due to the 
rhetorical potency of preparedness. 
 The concept of preparedness as a legislative position is most clearly spelled out by Porter, 
an idea which is largely developed in chapters 6 and 7 regarding the selective service bill. My 
analysis expands on Porter by tracing “preparedness” back to the neutrality bill and tracking it 
through the duration of Congress. From there, this concept is brought to entirely new territory in 
my analysis of the 1940 Senate elections. By looking at the rhetoric of two races in detail, we can 
see how incumbents and challengers, isolationists and interventionists, politicians and voters 
interacted with preparedness and used it to achieve their different political gains. 
 
Historiographical Note 
 The historical scholarship on the elections in 1940 is almost exclusively focused on the 
national election, contested between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie. Historians have 
been extremely interested in the extent which American entry into World War II impacted the 
presidential election in 1940 — as opposed to domestic issues or Roosevelt’s decision to run for 
an unprecedented third term. The two most recent works, both published in 2013, are Richard 
Moe, Roosevelt’s Second Act, and Susan Dunn, 1940.8 Moe places foreign policy, and 
particularly Roosevelt’s belief that Germany and Japan represented an existential threat to the 
United States, much more centrally than Dunn. Dunn argues that because Willkie was also an 
                                                
7 Title of chapter 7, Porter, 76th Congress. 
8 Susan Dunn, 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler--the Election Amid the Storm (New Haven 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013), Richard Moe, Roosevelt's Second Act: The Election of 1940 and the 
Politics of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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interventionist, foreign policy was key but not as important to the election as the issue of 
Roosevelt running for a third term.9 Donald Johnson’s much earlier work, The Republican Party 
and Wendell Willkie, complicates the understanding of this election with his portrait of the 
evolution of the Republican campaign in 1940, showing that many in the party (including 
Congressional leaders) were opposed to Willkie’s candidacy.10 Johnson demonstrates that 
Willkie, while pledging not to involve America in the war, was not ideologically an isolationist, 
suggesting that isolationist Senators might have lacked rhetorical support for their traditional 
arguments coming from the top of the Republican ticket. In light of the existing historiography, 
attention will be paid in this work to the effect of the third term question on the Senate elections 
in New York and Delaware. 
 These works, however, offer little evidence regarding the impact of World War II on 
Congressional races. There is negligible interest in the much more complicated role of the 
legislative branch — how voters felt about its performance, how Senators viewed their political 
roles, and how ideological positioning affected electoral outcomes. An exclusive focus on 
executive elections ignores the role of the U.S. Congress in determining foreign policy. 
Roosevelt was a very active president in 1939-40, setting the agenda and putting pressure on 
Congress to support his more interventionist policy aims. But Congress was not a rubber-
stamping body, as the debates over legislation about the war in Europe consumed much of the 
energy and drove much of the debate within the body. 
                                                
9 Susan Dunn, 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler--the Election Amid the Storm (New Haven 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013), Richard Moe, Roosevelt's Second Act : The Election of 1940 and the 
Politics of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
10 Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana,: University of 
Illinois Press, 1960). 
 9 
 The central work I have found that addresses the relationship between the Senate and 
World War II is David Porter, The Seventy-Sixth Congress and World War II. Porter argues that 
the two years during which the 76th Congress sat saw a shift in the body’s stance on foreign 
policy from a generally pro-isolationist perspective to a much more interventionist stance at its 
conclusion. Porter also identifies three key bills that defined this relationship — neutrality 
revision, establishing a selective service, and aid to Finland during the Russo-Finnish War — 
and traces the contours of the debate in Congress over each piece of legislation.11 More 
importantly, Porter provides the conceptual framework around which I center most of my 
analysis — the move towards “preparedness” generally. This work offers a comprehensive guide 
to the activities of the Senate in 1939 and 1940, which is invaluable in contextualizing the 
argument made in this thesis. However, Porter also sidesteps the role of the electoral process to 
members of Congress. There are no major works which address the topics which I set out to 
investigate — specifically, Senate elections in 1940 and the rhetorical decisions of Senators 
relating to the Second World War. In that context, this thesis makes a contribution to the 
historiography by complicating our understanding of the 1940 election, and by examining the 
contrasts between legislative and political rhetoric during a crucial period in American history.  
                                                
11 Further sources on these topics, which will be utilized in the body of this work: Robert A. 
Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Donald Francis 
Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1955), George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 
Robert Sobel, The Origins of Interventionism; the United States and the Russo-Finnish War (New York: 
Bookman Associates, 1961), and Andrew J. Schwartz, America and the Russo-Finnish War (Washington: 




The Legislative History of the 76th Congress 
 To understand the rhetorical positions of candidates for Senate, it is first necessary to 
analyze and assess the preceding Congress’s legislation on the war in Europe. The 76th Congress 
passed three major pieces of legislation between 1939 and 1940 which significantly shaped 
American foreign policy towards the war in Europe. Following the outbreak of war, Congress 
approved a revision to the preexisting Neutrality Acts in November 1939, which softened 
America’s stance of complete neutrality towards the war. Congress also approved very narrowly 
targeted aid to Finland in the winter of 1939-40; while it did not do anything to slow the advance 
of the Soviet Union, it did mark the first legislative action taken towards the European situation. 
Finally, Congress approved the first peacetime draft in American history in the fall of 1940, 
signaling a shift to a mentality of preparedness and setting the stage for a campaign that would 
be fought on wildly different ideological and rhetorical grounds than would have been 
conceivable in 1938. 
 
Neutrality Revision: The Introduction of Preparedness 
 During the 1930s, the American government responded to a rising tide of war in Europe 
with a series of bills which solidified neutrality as the position of the United States on the world 
stage. The repeal of these measures in September of 1939 began the transformation of legislative 
rhetoric in Congress towards the 1940 election. One post-World War I consensus, as put forward 
by Woodrow Wilson, was that the United States should work to actively stop wars from starting. 
However, during the 1930s an entirely different sentiment took hold in Congress and in the 
public: the United States “should adopt a stern policy of neutrality designed to insulate the nation 
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from the wars of the future”12 This began with the passage with an arms embargo in 1933 and 
expanded to the 1935 Neutrality Act, which responded to the advancement of both isolationism 
and pacifism within the United States.13 
 Beginning with the 76th Congress in 1939, however, President Roosevelt set out to unite 
the nation “behind a program of national preparedness” which would begin with revisions to the 
neutrality law.14 This is the first movement towards the rhetoric of preparedness; Roosevelt 
conceived of preparedness as a doctrine that could unite both parties while still preparing for 
what Roosevelt wanted, which would be to offer assistance to Britain and France. Despite an 
initial defeat of revisions to the neutrality law in Congress in August, the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September of 1939 brought the legislation back to the table.  
 In an address to Congress on September 21, Roosevelt laid out the case for the repeal of 
the arms embargo, framing his interventionist principles within the language of preparedness —
Divine goes so far to call it a “brilliant political speech.”15 Framing the repeal as a return to 
traditional American practice, Roosevelt went out of his way to avoid revealing “his deep 
concern for the fortunes of England and France.”16 This was a new rhetorical tack for the 
interventionists, signaled by the most powerful man in the United States. The new belief was that 
calling for preparedness would be more productive in turning public opinion to their side. Events 
would prove Roosevelt correct, as the public began to coalesce around the repeal of the arms 
embargo. Divine indicates that most major indicators of national opinion showed strong support 
                                                
12 Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 58 
13 Ibid., 58. 
14 Ibid., 230. 
15 Ibid., 296. 
16 Ibid., 297. 
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for the repeal, never falling below 56 percent of the country after Roosevelt’s speech.17 This 
figure supporting repeal includes both interventionists and isolationists. Other groups, including 
newspaper editors, international lawyers, and members of the Republican Party began to move 
towards repeal of the arms embargo.18 
 The debate within Congress notably began with the interventionists controlling 
congressional decision making for the first time — but, much like Roosevelt, they concealed 
their concerns about the war in Europe. Key Pittman, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, framed the legislation as “prevent[ing] our citizens from subjecting themselves to 
destruction in the mad war raging in Europe.”19 The isolationist side debated with more sound 
and fury than solid argumentation, not developing their critique of repeal from the debate earlier 
in the session.20 Those favoring the repeal of neutrality appealed, like Roosevelt, to a foreign 
policy based on international law. In Divine’s analysis, the preparedness framework meant that 
within Congress, the “debate had an artificial quality, with the real issue at stake being carefully 
hidden by profuse oratory portraying the [neutrality revision] bill as a measure designed solely to 
keep the nation out of war.”21 
 When the time came for a vote, Senator Mead of New York voted in favor of the measure 
repealing the arms embargo, while Senator Townsend of Delaware dissented. The bill was 
finally passed and sent to the President in November of 1939, the interventionists feeling that 
they had won a great victory. Despite understanding that the United States was not committed to 
                                                
17 Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, 307. 
18 Ibid., 308-310. 
19 Porter, 76th Congress, 68. 
20 Ibid., 69. 
21 Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, 218. 
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direct intervention in World War II, the isolationists further understood that they had suffered a 
great defeat. The internationalists had succeeded in pushing the United States towards the war 
for the first time. Neutrality revision legislation demonstrates a number of things about the 76th 
Congress. Congress was responsive to conditions in the European theater, reconsidering 
legislation as the facts on the ground changed. The neutrality bill also showed the strength of the 
rhetoric of preparedness, as isolationists and their allies lost a debate in Congress for the first 
time in several years. The final vote in the Senate was a decisive victory, with 55 members 
voting in favor and 24 opposed. Most importantly of all, though, the debate over the bill 
demonstrated the complicated forces shaping public opinion: citizens “torn between two 
incompatible notions — their fear of war and their desire for a German defeat.”22  
 
Finnish Aid: Limitations of the Interventionists 
 Though preparedness advocates had won the debate over the neutrality measure, not 
every situation offered such a clear-cut opportunity to push the United States towards 
interventionism. The second major piece of legislation considered by the 76th Congress — a bill 
that would send aid to Finland, at the time under attack by the Soviet Union — was much more 
difficult to for interventionists to frame as a question of preparedness. The Congressional debate 
over Finland demonstrates the much weaker status of interventionism vs. preparedness. In the 
face of profound tension between the desire to intervene to right a wrong — Finland losing its 
territory at the hands of a much stronger enemy — versus the innate caution and sense of 
isolationism felt by many in Congress, interventionists were not able to put together a winning 
argument. Forced to make arguments that appealed to ideology rather than self-defense, the 
                                                
22 Divine, Illusion of Neutrality, 311. 
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interventionists could not secure a piece of legislation that effectively helped beleaguered 
Finland. 
The war in Europe in 1939 and 1940 was, in reality, a number of smaller sub-conflicts. 
Following the conquest of Poland, much of the continent entered a period of “phony war,” where 
little combat actually seemed to be occurring. Neither the Germans nor the Allies conducted any 
large-scale land operations following the conquest of Poland in October 1939 until the eventual 
invasion of Norway in April 1940 and the Low Countries in May. It was — surprisingly enough 
— in the little Scandinavian nation of Finland where war would erupt next, and would provide 
the U.S. Congress its next opportunity to weigh in on foreign policy in Europe. After years of 
debate and negotiation over the border between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Soviets 
declared war against Finland rather suddenly in the fall of 1939.  
 The Finnish history with Russia, with whom the Finns share a border, dates back 
hundreds of years, but for the purposes of this discussion the pertinent information is that Finland 
had been annexed by the Tsarist state following the Finnish War of 1808-9. After a century of 
Russian rule, Finland declared and won their independence following the fall of the Tsarist 
regime and the institution of a Communist government in Russia.23 In the years following 
Finnish independence, the fledgling nation could count on the United States for support. 
Following the First World War, Finland and the United States cooperated amiably and began to 
build a strong diplomatic relationship. The United States pushed for early recognition of Finnish 
sovereignty by the nations of the world in 1919 and provided loans to support the state. Further 
diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Finland included an extradition treaty signed in 1924, 
                                                
23 A valuable sketch of this period of Finnish history can be found in chapters 7-9 of Eino 
Jutikkala, A History of Finland (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), trans. Paul Sjoblom. 
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arbitration and conciliation treaties in 1928, “a treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular 
rights” in 1934, and a trade agreement signed in 1936.24 
 However, as the situation in Europe teetered toward war and the United States shifted 
more subtly towards isolationism, the relationship with Finland suffered. The Soviet Union 
continued to pressure Finland into ceding territory. The Finns made a request for diplomatic 
support from the United States in April of 1939, but their request was declined.25 The Finns and 
the Russians negotiated through the fall of 1939, but they were unable to come to a mutually 
beneficial outcome. Three days following an incident where artillery was fired along the Finnish 
border near a Soviet village, the Winter War broke out, with the USSR launching “a well-
planned and co-ordinated attack by land, sea, and air against Finland.”26 
 Despite a courageous resistance put up to the Russian invasion — Finnish citizens were 
fond of mockingly stating “There are so many [Russians] and our country is so small, where 
shall we find the space to bury them all?” — the Finns sought aid however they could, 
particularly from the United States.27 The United States was certainly sympathetic to Finland. 
Jakobson describes Russia’s actions as arousing more indignation in America than anywhere else 
in the world; “The Finns were America’s pet nation in Europe: they had always paid their debts 
and committed no known sins against the laws of nations.”28 At this point, the American public 
still saw the Soviet Union as an enemy — much of the public remained deeply skeptical of 
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Communism. Further, the Soviets were at the time non-belligerent against the Axis, as the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact secured Soviet cooperation with the Nazis in the initial phase of the 
war.29 Despite this, Roosevelt proceeded very cautiously, and referred the matter for Congress to 
decide, pushing an increase in the apportionment of the Export-Import Bank with the 
understanding that it would be used to aid Finland.30 
 Within Congress, the interventionists made arguments which stressed anti-Communism 
and anti-totalitarianism.31 In the floor debate, the interventionists cast the actions of Russia as far 
outside the realm of acceptable behavior, the ideological opposite of the United States.32 
However, isolationists were fearful of the possibility that the loan would be a small step towards 
direct involvement. This is exemplified by Senator Rush Holt’s statement that “I cannot cast my 
vote for a step, even though it may be a small step that might mean the death or destruction of 
American boys.”33 Crucially, the interventionists could not muster any arguments about this 
legislation improving American preparedness for war, as the bill directly offered assistance to 
one side in the conflict. 
 Senator Townsend did speak during the debate on this measure, but his argument veered 
far off of the usual arguments for intervention and non-intervention. As we shall see in a 
succeeding chapter, Townsend’s national political focus was on changing America’s gold and 
silver policies — in short, he wanted to stop the purchase of gold by the United States. In his 
floor remarks on February 8, Townsend began by stating: “we are all seeking the most practical 
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way to help Finland. In my judgment, the most practical way to help Finland is to find some way 
to stop sending to Russia materials with which to destroy Finland.”34 Townsend went on to cite 
an article describing the landing of a freighter containing $5,600,000 in bar gold from the Soviet 
Union earlier that day. The sale of gold, the Senator stated, was of direct benefit to the Soviet 
Union. “I say,” he concluded, “the most practical manner in which we can help Finland is to find 
some method by which we can stop sending to other countries materials to destroy Finland, and 
taking in return gold for which we have no use.”35  
 The Senate bill eventually provided $20 million in aid to Finland, though it came with the 
provisio that the money could not be used to buy arms. The final vote was 58-29 in favor. The 29 
votes in opposition are seen by Sobel as evidence of the depth of belief held by many on the 
isolationist wing of the Senate — if you couldn’t support Finland, what nation would you 
support?36 Both Mead and the isolationist John Townsend voted in favor of the bill, perhaps 
evidence of how much the isolationists were able to restrict the scope of the legislation. The 
President did not sign the bill until March 2; by then it was too late for Finland, who were forced 
on March 12 to surrender and sign a treaty that placed them under Russian domination.37 As 
Jakobson puts it, the vote was evidence that the U.S. “not yet the great arsenal of the 
democracies.”38 The interventionist faction had been gaining strength, but in a situation that did 
not fit within the rhetorical position of preparedness it proved difficult to steer the ship of state in 
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their preferred direction. Nevertheless, the bill was still the first attempt to directly intervene in 
the European conflicts, and signaled the slow evolution of Congressional opinion. 
 
The Peacetime Draft: Preparedness Victorious 
 The final piece of legislation relating to the war in Europe considered by the 76th 
Congress instituted a peacetime draft in the United States.  The conscription measure offered 
much more advantageous ground to the interventionists, who argued for the bill explicitly as a 
necessary tool so that the United States would be prepared if forced to enter the war. The 
ultimate passage of the bill completed a shocking transformation in the political approach to the 
war in Europe, with Congress backing this unprecedented measure to prepare the United States 
for war. 
Before 1940, a peacetime draft had never been instituted in American history. In the 
shadow of crisis in Europe, however, the concept of conscription in America during peacetime 
moved from almost unthinkable to reality at a shockingly rapid pace. As late as the Democratic 
convention in July, President Roosevelt called only for “some form of selection by draft” rather 
than mass conscription.39 The public was extremely polarized on the topic. Though polling data 
suggested that a slim majority supported the draft, mail received at the White House totaled two 
to one against conscription.40 
 Within Congress, the debate over the draft shifted the ideological camps in a 
internationalist direction. Porter argues that the conversation “changed from a debate between 
interventionists and noninterventionists to one involving preparedness advocates and rearmament 
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opponents.”41 The delineation between an “interventionist” and a “preparedness advocate” is 
most clearly demonstrated with this legislation, as support for the draft was seen by some 
Senators as perfectly consistent with the rejection of Finnish aid or other interventionist 
measures. However, as we shall see in succeeding chapters, the “preparedness advocate” 
framework would be used rhetorically by interventionist politicians to frame their positions less 
aggressively — in order to appeal to a citizenry skeptical of foreign entanglements. This effect 
was maximized in the region of the country examined in this thesis; northeastern delegations, 
such as New York and Delaware, were much more supportive of the selective service legislation 
than other regions.42 
 As members of Congress debated furiously, the nation followed suit, as both 
preparedness advocates and rearmament opponents engaged in massive campaigns to sway the 
nation to their side. Supporters of the draft lobbied the nation’s newspaper editors with great 
success — in July, 87 percent of newspaper editors favored the draft.43 Meanwhile, opponents of 
the draft flooded offices with direct mail. Republican Representative Bruce Barton claimed that 
letters came into his office 10 to 1 against selective service.44 Strong constituencies lined up to 
oppose the draft — organized labor, major religious groups, and educational institutions all had 
major issues with the proposed legislation. 
 When the measure came to the floor, isolationist Senators monopolized the floor debate. 
When supporters of preparedness did speak, they confined their remarks to themes of security. 
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The deteriorating situation in Europe, with the collapse of France in June, added potency to these 
Senators’ remarks. Tom Connally chose the most evocative language, stating that he didn’t want 
American youths “to have to wait until we are plunged into war to receive their training in the 
battlefield amidst blood and slaughter.”45 Porter notes that in this debate, interventionists and 
preparedness advocates did not overlap neatly, with some interventionists citing the draft as a 
violation of democratic principles, a boon to northeastern industry, or a distraction from more 
pressing economic concerns in their opposition.46 
 Porter and Flynn diverge somewhat on what finally led to the passage of the peacetime 
draft legislation. Flynn argues that passage was mainly a response to the events in Europe in 
1940, catastrophic as it was to the Allies.47 Porter, on the other hand, points to supportive 
statements by both Roosevelt and Republican Presidential nominee Wendell Willkie as finally 
breaking the deadlock, though it could certainly be argued that this support flowed from the 
situation in Europe.48 Ultimately, by the end of August, the Senate passed the bill, importantly 
including two amendments to narrow the age of selection to only citizens aged 21 to 31 and to 
limit their service to the Western Hemisphere.49 As one would expect based on their ideological 
leanings, Senator Mead voted for the bill and Senator Townsend voted against. 
The passage of the peacetime draft bill completed the political and rhetorical shift which 
dominated the 76th Congress’s engagement with the war in Europe. Within a year, a body which 
was unwilling to accept even minor revisions to the Neutrality Acts was instituting the first 
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mechanism for peacetime conscription in American history; America’s youth would learn “just 
how to put his full weight back of a bayonet’s thrust.”50 As one-third of the Senate headed into 
an election, along with the full House of Representatives and the President of the United States, 
an entirely new rhetoric of security through preparedness, rather than interventionism or 
isolation, had emerged as a potent force. It was at the ballot box that this profound shift would 
receive its most important verdict, as we shall see in the elections in New York and Delaware.  
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Chapter 2 
Against “A Psychology of Fear”: James Mead, Bruce Barton, and the New York Campaign 
 In 1940, New York Senator James M. Mead’s bid for reelection became a referendum on 
President Roosevelt — himself a New York native — and specifically his decision to run for a 
third term. It was largely because of the war in Europe that F.D.R. sought an unprecedented 
return to the White House. Consequently, the political battle was waged around the war in 
Europe and how the United States should react. Mead’s opponent, Rep. Bruce Barton, developed 
a critique of the President which suggested that Roosevelt’s eventual goal was dictatorship, with 
entrance to the European conflict just the first step in the process. From there, Senator Mead was 
described as a rubber-stamp for Roosevelt who would not defend the interests of New Yorkers. 
Mead, on the other hand, focused on preparedness — a commitment to national defense — and 
his strong history of supporting labor interests. 
 James Mead actively cultivated the persona of a working man in his political image. In 
the year 1898, at age 12, Mead — the son, brother, and nephew of railroad workmen — “quit 
school to go to work as a water boy” on the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad 
Company.51 From that simple act began a career that brought Mead to the presidency of the AFL 
switchmen’s union, the New York State Legislature, the U.S. House of Representatives, and 
finally in 1938 to the Senate. Mead was, first and foremost, a Senator concerned with labor — a 
fierce defender of President Roosevelt’s New Deal and of the interests of the working class. 
 Mead did not make many floor statements on the war in Europe during his two years in 
the Senate. However, the appendices of the Congressional Record are useful, as Senators were 
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able to add the text of remarks previously made by themselves or others for posterity. These texts 
offer a useful window into the thinking of individual Senators, as what a Senator chose to add to 
the Record reflected their passions or opinions, though not in their own words. For Mead, the 
appendices demonstrate that he was primarily concerned about American defense. Most 
revealingly, in April of 1940 Mead introduced an article by Walter Winchell into the appendix, 
which argued for a liberal approach to American defense: “If so much as one foot of land from 
Alaska to the Argentine is occupied by any foreign invader, these United States will fight for that 
foot of land until that Invader is expelled or destroyed.” Winchell continues to state that “we are 
not prepared [—] we must stop kidding ourselves that Americans can lick anybody.”52 Mead’s 
approval of Winchell’s assessment is notable; it depicts an expansive notion of where the United 
States has a commitment to defend. This also indicates Mead’s early adoption of the 
“preparedness” framework to national defense, as his introduction of this article well preceded 
any floor debate over the draft. 
 Legislatively, Mead’s activities in foreign policy were minor. In the debate over the 
Selective Service, Mead commended an amendment offered by Senator Guffey of Pennsylvania 
which would exempt divinity students from the draft.53 Mead also offered an amendment to the 
defense appropriations bill which would construct a “maximum-size drydock” in New York 
Harbor to deal with the largest ships; the amendment was agreed to and taken to the conference 
committee with the Senate. His voting record, however, was consistently internationalist, as 
Porter classifies him.54 Mead voted in favor of the three major pieces of legislation — the 
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neutrality bill, aid to Finland, and the selective service bill — which pushed American foreign 
policy much more towards a war footing.55 
 
The Rumblings of Fascism 
 Mead’s Republican opponent in the 1940 election was Representative Bruce Barton. 
Some party members considered Barton, a former advertising man concluding his second term in 
the House of Representatives, as a possible Presidential candidate in 1940.56 Barton initially 
declined to run for the office near the end of August, and the New York Republicans were more 
than happy to let him do so. But Wendell Willkie wanted Barton, an early supporter of Willkie’s 
presidential campaign, and Willkie strongly communicated this wish to the state party.57 Despite 
attempts to recruit several other candidates to accept the nomination, including Col. Theodore 
Roosevelt —son of the former President — and District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, Willkie’s 
wishes pushed candidate and party to the same conclusion.58 Despite some lingering tension, the 
Republicans selected Barton to oppose Mead’s reelection at their convention in September.59 
 Bruce Barton, like Willkie, was far from a hard-core isolationist, and instead focused his 
campaign against Roosevelt’s excesses and Mead’s reflexive support for the administration. In 
the House, Barton’s record indicated a moderate approach to foreign policy. Barton voted against 
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the revisions to the Neutrality Acts, but did support legislation creating the Selective Service.60 
Yet Barton’s campaign rhetoric and strategy centered around President Roosevelt, and attempted 
to play on fears that Roosevelt would move to become a dictator. He hammered the decision to 
run for a third term in near-apocalyptic terms. Barton then sought to tie Senator Mead to the 
President by accusing him of being a rubber-stamp for the President in the Senate. Barton’s allies 
also promoted his personal integrity and character as a good reason to vote for him. The war in 
Europe was an integral part of this strategy, as Barton stated that the decision to go to war would 
lead gradually to the establishment of a personal dictatorship. ?? ?? 
 Barton’s sharpest attacks on Roosevelt came during the last week of September, when the 
state convention was deliberating over whom to choose as the party’s nominee. At an address on 
September 25 — before he was officially nominated — Barton told a Republican crowd that 
Roosevelt’s Washington allies “are saying that if President Roosevelt is elected the Seventy-
seventh Congress [the next] will be the last American Congress to assemble in our lifetime.”61 
This statement implies that Roosevelt’s intention was to do away with the legislative branch 
entirely. In an attempt to further develop this critique of Roosevelt as a dictator, Barton 
emphasized Roosevelt’s “contempt for Congress” and told Republicans that the coming election 
“is no tea party [—] this is a life and death fight.”62 
 In his speech accepting the nomination two days later, Barton delivered a fiery and 
hyperbolic description of the coming election, declaring that “the American people must decide 
[…] whether they will gamble with their liberties by electing a president for the third term” and 
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that “so far as I am concerned [the third term] is the only issue” in the coming election.63 He 
reiterated that a third term for Roosevelt might mean the end of Congressional elections for the 
foreseeable future. Most ominously, Barton declared, “I am unqualifiedly persuaded that the 
third term means war; that American boys will be sent east and west to police the world and risk 
their lives, or lay down their lives, not by hundreds or thousands, but by hundreds of 
thousands.”64 In this Barton worldview, the war in Europe was not a moral issue or even an 
international political issue, but a domestic question of one man’s quest for power. To this end, 
Barton occasionally indulged some extremely broad allegations. He claimed, in one speech, that 
the Roosevelt administration had engaged in a “wave of secret diplomacy” and would, in the 
third term, seek to establish work camps across the country for America’s youth.65 
 Despite Barton’s grim warnings about impending dictatorship, he also described himself 
in favor of national defense generally, framing himself as not an isolationist but as a non-
interventionist. Barton claimed that, in the House, he had “voted for every single measure of 
national defense.”66 Further, he attacked Mead as “ignoring the shockingly defenseless position 
of our country” during his time in the Senate.67   
 Aside from foreign policy, Barton attempted to paint the incumbent Mead as a rubber-
stamp for White House policies — a White House that was not to be trusted. Barton did not 
directly attack specific votes made by Mead in his two years in the Senate. Instead he cast Mead 
as a robot or an automaton, declaring at times that “the White House presses the button and the 
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Senator answers ‘Aye’ or ‘No.’”68 One variant of this attack was to paint Mead as a servant of 
the administration over the people of New York — in one speech Barton declared that Mead was 
“a good senator for Florida, Alabama and Georgia.”69 Barton would also parry Mead’s promise 
to not send soldiers to war by simply stating “he must vote as he always has voted, the way the 
President tells him to vote.”70 Barton’s argument, summarized best in the Times the day before 
the election, was that Mead was little more than a lacky, incapable of reaching his own 
judgments. “If the third term [for FDR] prevails,” Barton declared, “[Mead] does not know 
whether he will be in a position to keep his promise[s]. He must vote as he always has voted, the 
way the President tells him to vote.”71 Barton, on the other hand, claimed that he was beholden to 
no man and could keep his promises.72 
 
The Messenger of Preparedness 
 To James Mead, Barton’s strategy must have seemed quite strange. In F.D.R.’s home 
state, Mead made the opposite bet — that tying himself to the President would prove politically 
successful in the election. Mead’s campaign on foreign policy was entirely based around the 
concept of preparedness, making a very simple argument — the Democratic administration was 
merely concerned about preserving a strong national defense, and that any assertions that the 
third term would lead to dictatorship were dangerous. In various public appearances, Mead 
described his opponent as creating a “partisan war scare” and a “psychology of fear” surrounding 
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the campaign.73 Rather than advocating for war, Mead argued for preparation towards the 
eventuality that war would begin. 
 The preparedness framework was evident from the very beginning of the campaign, when 
Mead accepted the Democratic nomination at their convention on September 30. On the topic of 
national defense, he stated that Republicans “would, in their political efforts, undermine the 
national-defense program, not the program of the President nor the program of the Democratic 
Party, but the precautionary national-defense program of our country.”74 He quoted Roosevelt’s 
statement that “we will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our Army, naval, or 
air forces to fight in foreign lands, outside of the Americas, except in case of attack.”75 The 
emphasis was on precautionary measures and only entering any war if already attacked. 
 This rhetorical framework allowed Mead to go on the offense criticizing the Republican 
approach to defense. In a speech on October 22, Mead argued that Republican concerns about 
the state of the national defenses were hypocritical, as the G.O.P. had been the ones opposing 
increases in military spending.76 In a talk on Long Island the following week, Mead made this 
more explicit: “In one breath, the Republicans claim they are for more and better military 
activity, but every time the President attempts to better our defenses he is declared a ‘war 
monger.”77 By drawing out this contradiction, Mead was able to advocate his own approach for 
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national defense, such as the building of “defense highways” in the northern part of the U.S. —
 highways that could also be used during peacetime.78 
 For Mead, a Senator who maintained strong ties to labor throughout his political career, 
preparedness was complementary to an aggressive stance defending the New Deal and workers’ 
rights. The week after Barton secured the nomination, Mead declared in a congratulatory 
message that he would make the campaign “New Deal and the merits of the two Presidential 
candidates” — though the New Deal sometimes a back seat to the third term and national 
defense.79 In his address accepting the nomination, Mead described the Republican approach as 
“general attacks are made on the New Deal, and yet almost every specific measure is either 
extolled by the opposition, or else we are led to believe that its future remains secure.”80 Mead 
stayed on comfortable turf in his condemnation of the Republican ticket for a declared “anti-
labor” stance. In the last week of the campaign, for example, Mead gave a speech tracing a 
“grim, brutal story” of Wendell Willkie’s past record on labor issues, citing Willkie’s companies 
being called before the National Labor Relations Board amid accusations of refusing to bargain 
with workers.81 The next day, at a Madison Square Garden rally headlined by vice presidential 
candidate Henry Wallace, Mead again went after Willkie and Barton. The New York Times 
described the content of his remarks as calling the two Republicans no friend of labor.82 
Appearing with Roosevelt in Brooklyn, Mead asked rhetorically what Barton and other 
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Republicans had been doing “when this administration was hammering out new economic and 
spiritual horizons for the common man.”83 
 The two candidates rarely shared the same stage. When they did, though, the war in 
Europe came straight to the forefront, sharply demonstrating the rhetorical cleavages at play in 
the race. At an October 27 event at the Young Men’s Hebrew Association in Manhattan, Barton 
and Mead spoke back to back. Barton, who spoke first, argued that the election of Willkie would 
ensure “our boys will never have to fight on foreign soil” while “if the third term prevails, they 
certainly will be fighting for a good share of their lives.”84 Mead, by contrast, pivoted toward the 
question of national defense — under Roosevelt “the defenses of America are being prepared at 
an accelerated rate” — while simultaneously pointing to a statement in the Democratic platform 
that the war would not happen.85 This was the central fissure of the campaign on foreign policy 
— whether the buildup of the national defense was a necessity in a dangerous world or a 
pretense for a ruthless power grab. 
 Three major newspaper endorsements were handed out in the week before the election, 
none of which engaged deeply with foreign policy questions. Barton earned the endorsement of 
the New York Herald Tribune. The Herald Tribune pointed to Barton’s “sincerity and with his 
openness of mind and his eagerness to exchange views with his constituents” while not 
criticizing Mead.86 Mead picked up the endorsement of the New York Amsterdam News, a black 
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newspaper based in Harlem. The endorsement, though, made no mention of the national election, 
merely lauding Mead for being “consistent in his efforts to advance the Negro’s cause.”87 The 
Times did not explicitly endorse either man, but its column was critical of both. Mead is 
described as “an uncritical supporter of the policies — good, bad and indifferent — of the 
present administration,” while Barton drew praise for his positions, independence, and ability. 
Interestingly, though, the Times criticized Barton for voting against repealing the Neutrality 
Act’s arms embargo, arguing that the repeal was necessary to support Great Britain.88 On the 
same page, the Times reiterated its endorsement of Willkie over F.D.R., citing the third term 
tradition, Willkie’s ability to restart the economy and restore the defense, and Willkie’s non-
ideological approach to governing.89  
In the end, though, Mead emerged victorious, earning 53.26% of the vote to Barton’s 
46.66%.90 Interestingly, Mead’s margin ran well ahead of Roosevelt’s; while Mead won by over 
430,000 votes, Roosevelt’s margin was only about 233,000 in an election described by the Times 
as “marked by strange cross-currents.”91 The vote totals suggest that voters were swayed by 
claims against the third term, while still accepting the preparedness framework put forward by 
Mead. For all of Barton’s dramatic and fiery rhetoric about the dangers of reelecting Roosevelt 
and Mead, the voters rejected his alternative at the polls. These results indicate that Barton 
should be remembered not as any sort of great statesman or influential figure, but as a candidate 
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who was unable to muster a compelling argument for why he should be in office. An incumbent 
running on a platform of preparedness, such as Mead, had the upper hand, as the voters of New 
York State returned him to Washington D.C. It wasn’t a dictatorship at home that the voters were 




The “Busiest Senator” Falls: John Townsend and the Delaware Campaign 92 
 
An unnamed cartoonist describes John G. Townsend, Jr. as “an experienced legislator and 
recognized as an authority on financial problems.” Wilmington Sunday Star, October 27, 1940. 
 
 There are many ways to attempt to define Delaware, but it is difficult to avoid using the 
word small. The second-smallest state in the nation by land area, Delaware has a unique political 
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climate that is a function of its size. The old adage is that “all politics is personal;” it might be 
more accurate to say that “politics in Delaware is familial.” 
 Certainly no contemporary would accuse John G. Townsend, Jr., Delaware’s sitting two-
term Republican Senator, of being distant and lost to Washington politics. According to the 
Wilmington Sunday Morning Star — a major weekly paper in Delaware’s largest city — he 
earned the honor of being known as “the Delawarean who knows more of his fellow citizens than 
any other man in the state.”93 Yet in 1940 this icon of Delawarean politics was unceremoniously 
removed from office, defeated along with Wendell Willkie in a state that had happily sent him to 
Congress for two prior terms.  
Townsend’s defeat was due to a number of reasons, not least of which was the 
overwhelming popularity of Franklin Roosevelt in Delaware, and Wendell Willkie’s presidential 
campaign did the incumbent no favors with its emphasis on “no third term” rhetoric. The 
challenger, James Tunnell, hammered Townsend within the preparedness framework, charging 
that Townsend was leaving the United States defenseless. This race demonstrates the potency of 
the rhetoric of preparedness, as the incumbent senator was unable to mount an effective defense 
of his isolationist impulses in the face of Tunnell’s critique. 
 For this section, my analysis will rest primarily on two major sources — the two largest 
newspapers in Delaware at the time, the Journal-Every Evening and the Wilmington Sunday 
Morning Star. The Journal-Every Evening was a daily evening newspaper, though it did not 
publish on Sundays, with a strong editorial slant in favor of Republican candidates. The Sunday 
Morning Star, a weekly paper that published on Sunday, was much more even-handed in its 
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coverage of politics. The Star published many letters to the editors as well as a pair of columns 
analyzing politics from the perspective of the two parties, written by anonymous observers: “In 
G.O.P. Ranks” by “Onlooker” and “Democratic Musings” by “Thomas Jefferson.” From these, 
we can construct a detailed picture of the campaign that was waged in public. 
 
A Man of Integrity 
 Entering the election in 1940, John G. Townsend, Jr. was wrapping up the last year of his 
second six-year term in the U.S. Senate — the capstone to a career that had seen him hold a bevy 
of offices in Delaware. Townsend was first sent to the state legislature in 1900, and was elevated 
to the governor’s office in 1916. After one term in the governor’s office, Townsend returned to 
political office with his election to the Senate in 1928 and 1934. Townsend, a Republican from 
Selbyville in southern Delaware, also tended to some of the largest orchards in the country — he 
is described approvingly in the Sunday Morning Star as “an outstanding fruit grower.”94 
 In the 76th Congress, Townsend had two priorities — national fiscal stability and helping 
local concerns in Delaware. Townsend’s outlook on politics was primarily that of a fiscal 
conservative, as he opposed many New Deal programs and was consistently worried about the 
money supply. Townsend’s opinions on these matters can be seen in the editorials he introduced 
in the Congressional Record. One, published in the Wilmington Journal-Every Evening, argued 
that President Roosevelt’s spending plans have failed to invigorate the economy. Since 1933, the 
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editorial claimed, the New Dealers “have distributed more money than all of the rest of the world 
put together, and they have secured the poorest results.”95 
 Townsend’s pet political project was a bill that would repeal the government’s silver-
purchasing program, established in 1934. The government would buy domestic and foreign and 
silver at set prices in an attempt to raise the price of silver and create silver reserves. Townsend, 
along with many in the eastern part of the country, were opposed to the program. During the first 
session of the 76th Congress, Townsend introduced into the Congressional Record editorials that 
were printed in newspapers around the country, such as the New York Times, Washington 
Evening Star, and Minneapolis Tribune, in advocacy of his silver bill.96 The editorial in the 
Evening Star is typical of these comments, arguing that “this policy has failed” to achieve its 
goals and describes it as “a billion-dollar smoke screen to hide a $180,000,000 direct subsidy to 
the mine owners in seven Western states.”97 Townsend’s passion about this policy impacted his 
views on foreign policy; as mentioned in chapter 1, he mostly viewed the situation regarding aid 
to Finland as an opportunity to expound upon the misguided nature of the government’s bullion 
policies. 
 More than these national concerns, though, Townsend was committed to the 
representation of his constituents, working at the margins to help specific communities within 
Delaware. For example, the Civilian Conservation Corps had established camps to work on 
mosquito control in Kent and Sussex Counties during the 1930s. These parts of the state, with 
their extensive coastlines, represented a breeding ground for mosquitoes. Townsend spent much 
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of the 76th Congress advocating for the continuation of these CCC camps in Kent & Sussex 
Counties.98 Townsend also played a valuable role as a well-respected leader in local politics, 
helping, for example, to end a ferry strike in New Castle.99 
 Viewed as a hard-working senator who was committed to his constituents, in the Senate 
Townsend confined himself to domestic affairs whenever possible.100 When he did make public 
comments, Townsend expressed his worries about the U.S. possibly joining the burgeoning 
European conflict. A newspaper in Portland, Oregon quoted Townsend as “fearful that sale of 50 
destroyers to England means ‘We’re in.’” Though sympathetic to the Allied cause, Townsend 
believed that England could be supported without the U.S. actually joining the conflict.101 This 
suggests that Townsend’s isolationism was pragmatic, rather than reflecting a deep ideological 
belief about the United States staying out of wars. Rather than supporting Willkie initially, 
Townsend’s preferred choice was his fellow Senator, Robert Taft of Ohio — much more active 
within floor debates in Congress than Willkie, and much more of a strict isolationist.102 
Townsend did not, however, speak publicly on this matter, preferring to stay out of any visible 
conflicts within his own party.103 Townsend’s major legislative push on foreign policy related to 
the military pay scale, as following the passage of conscription he introduced legislation 
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designed to increase the salary for enlisted men who served previously in the National Guard.104 
Introduced after the draft bill, which Townsend voted against, the Journal-Every Evening noted 
that Townsend “believes that if soldiers were given adequate pay, there would be no need for 
conscription. He intends to continue the fight for an increase of pay for the National 
Guardsmen.”105 
Townsend’s challenger in 1940 was a long-time Delaware politico, James M. Tunnell, 
Sr., who grabbed the Democratic Party’s nomination. As Carter notes, this was not entirely a 
surprising result, as Tunnell had close ties to the Democratic establishment; he “had been 
Delaware’s Democratic National Committeeman for several years and had a well-established 
network of friends among the national Democratic leadership.”106 A long-time politico who had 
been active in statewide campaigns for over 40 years, Tunnell was a natural choice to make a bid 
for the Senate. Though Tunnell was certainly well-connected, as a candidate he also offered the 
Democratic party certain political advantages. Like Townsend, Tunnell came from the 
southernmost county of Delaware — Sussex County — and as such could cut into the 
incumbent’s traditional power base.107 Tunnell’s experience further made him a formidable 
opponent for Townsend. Few men could match Townsend’s political experience in Delaware, 
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The Paradox of the Townsend Campaign 
 Townsend based his campaign rhetoric on his great experience and influence within 
Congress, arguing that he was a man of integrity committed to public service. However, the 
campaign of Presidential candidate Wendell Willkie complicated Townsend’s campaign with its 
critique of President Roosevelt’s decision to run for a third term. Townsend — also running for a 
third term in the Senate — found himself in the difficult position of arguing that his experience 
in the Senate deserved a third term, but the Democratic presidential candidate’s experience in the 
Presidency disqualified him from one. 
 The fundamentals of the campaign did not seem to favor Townsend at the outset. 
President Roosevelt and his programs enjoyed great popularity in Delaware, and Townsend had 
never been placed on the same ballot as F.D.R. (Townsend’s last election, in 1934, was a 
midterm year). In Carter’s analysis, “most Delawareans liked Townsend personally and were 
proud of his obvious national prominence, but they were buying the Democratic view that the 
country needed Roosevelt to pilot the ship of state through dangerous waters.”108 Townsend’s 
attention was also somewhat divided — he remained committed to his Senate duties, as well as 
his reappointment as chairman of the Republican Senate Congressional Committee. This 
position, which he had held in the past, made him invaluable to the national cause for the 
Republicans but also added to the burdens on his time.109 On Townsend’s side, though, was his 
expertise; given his time with the NRSC, Carter argues that “in 1940, no one in the United States 
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knew more about the mechanics of a successful senatorial campaign than John Townsend 
did.”110 
 The rhetorical thrust of Townsend’s campaign relied heavily on his history of public 
service. A typical ad, placed in the Journal-Every Evening three days before the election, argued 
that Townsend’s “experience as a war-time Governor and U.S. Senator makes him a valuable 
asset to the Nation in these critical times.” Rather than looking back at past policy decisions 
made by Townsend, the implicit argument is that voters should trust his judgment moving 
forward. The next line of the ad — “[Townsend] is against war but is for an adequate defense 
against all possible perils” — suggests a willingness to make tough decisions for the sake of the 
country.111 A separate ad referenced Townsend’s “USEFULNESS TO THE NATION” for his 
service on many committees — more than any other Senator.112 The October 6 edition of “In 
G.O.P. Ranks” hammered on this point of principle. Along with Representative George 
Williams, Townsend is said to “deserve the respect of all Delawareans because they fought the 
New Deal when they believed it needed opposition.”113 
 Yet the rhetoric of the Presidential campaign made Townsend’s argument about 
experience difficult to justify. President Roosevelt was, in choosing to run again in 1940, 
breaking the unwritten tradition — first established by George Washington — for the President 
to limit himself to two terms in office.114 Republicans, already skeptical of the President’s 
conduct during his first two terms, seized upon the issue and sought to paint the “third term” 
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decision as anti-American and contrary to the spirit of democracy. These included the formation 
of a “no third term” society, nominally independent and directed at defending the two-term 
principle. Of course, this situation presented a problem for supporters of Townsend, who was 
himself seeking a third term in the Senate. While no such tradition of limiting oneself to two 
terms existed in the upper house, it still created a certain amount of irony. Carter, in particular, 
believes that this issue cost Townsend dearly, as the irony of Willkie attacking Roosevelt for 
seeking a third term but endorsing Townsend for a third term could not be easily explained 
away.115 
 There is contemporary evidence that Townsend’s supporters were keenly aware of this 
irony, and they took to the papers to expound upon the differences between Roosevelt and 
Townsend. In a September letter to the editor, signed “F.A.C.,” the writer delineates a distinction 
between a senator and a president running for a third term. “A member of the U.S. Senate 
becomes more valuable to his constituency and to the country through experience and that there 
is no way in which extension of service may result in abuse of office. On the other hand, 
discussion of a third term for a President of the United States has always resulted in the 
conclusion that such an extension of service would be fraught with danger.”116 When you vote 
for Townsend, F.A.C. argued, “you confer upon him no extension of great authority, and you 
vote for him and not a regime” — implying that a vote for Roosevelt would be exactly that.117 A 
letter published the subsequent week echoes this distinction regarding the role of experience 
between Congress and the Presidency, using an evocative metaphor: “When a baseball team 
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begins to falter because of bad management, the owner does not proceed to dismiss the best 
players, but instead eliminates the manager.”118 Regardless of the validity of these arguments, for 
Republican incumbents running on a platform of experience and integrity, the portrayal of 
Roosevelt’s campaign as anti-Democratic was a major roadblock to success. 
 Townsend also borrowed elements of the preparedness framework which fit his political 
philosophies. Townsend surprisingly voted in favor of aid to Finland and could, if necessary, 
make a more nuanced argument about foreign policy. At a speech in Wilmington in October 11, 
Townsend described America’s condition as “miserably unprepared” for war — a war that he 
believed Roosevelt was trying to start.119 Townsend also criticized the profligate spending of the 
Roosevelt administration — “waste which in seven years has increased the national debt by more 
than the debt of the preceding 144 years” — though he notably exempted “expenditures in the 
national defense.”120 By taking the preparedness framework and combining it with Townsend’s 
fiscal conservatism, Townsend made a relatively unique argument about foreign policy. 
 
Attacking the Record 
 The Democratic campaign, in contrast, focused on attacking Townsend’s history in the 
Senate and arguing that he did not represent the interests of Delawareans. Democrats advertised 
Townsend’s record of “solid opposition” to New Deal measures, labor legislation, defense bills. 
Labor interests came after Townsend for several votes from his time in the Senate. The day 
before the election, an advertisement was placed in the Journal Every-Evening with the sub-
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headline “SENATOR TOWNSEND VOTES “NO” TO LABOR.” (The broader purpose of the 
advertisement was to oppose Wendell Willkie as “a matter of LIFE and DEATH” for labor.) The 
ad provides synopses of eight bills which Townsend voted against from 1933-1939; topics 
include instituting the five day week, creating a housing authority, and establishing Social 
Security.121 The factual assertions were technically true, even if they might not reflect 
Townsend’s exact position. A vote against a broad appropriations bill, which Townsend might 
have cast for whatever reason, was presented as a direct attack on a specific issue. Carter 
characterizes these as “do you still beat your wife?” ads — even in the course of fighting them 
off, Townsend was forced into combating an uncomfortable premise.122 In the Sunday Star, the 
“Democratic Musings” opinion column reinforced this situation with a flat assertion: “There can 
be no denial that labor is not friendly to Senator Townsend.”123 
 Tunnell himself was comfortable throwing a sharp jab or a flying elbow in the direction 
of the incumbent. In a radio address on WDEL, Tunnell described Townsend as one of the “most 
hard-shelled, die-hard conservatives in the U.S. Senate.”124 Tunnell strategically went after votes 
on an array of bills, primarily omnibus appropriations bills, to paint Townsend as an opponent of 
national defense and social security; “There were only five other senators in the entire United 
States Senate who took the same position [against Social Security].”125 Tunnell sought to make 
Townsend appear as the anti-Roosevelt; more importantly, the preparedness approach allowed 
Tunnell to characterize Townsend’s votes as irresponsible. 
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 Tunnell and the Democratic Party were unafraid to pick at every part of Townsend’s 
copious record in the Senate to put him on the defensive. On WDEL, the attacks were on local 
appropriations; at a rally, the assault was on Townsend’s votes on defense. In front of 1,200 
people at the Playhouse in Wilmington — a rally headlined by Social Security Administrator 
Paul V. McNutt — Tunnell “charged that the Senator’s accomplishments in the Senate could be 
told in one minute but that it would take a long time to tell of all the measure which he has voted 
into defeat.” In the litany of measures that Townsend had opposed or defeated, the challenger 
specifically cited votes against bills for naval appropriations and to acquire more army planes — 
bills, in other words, related to the national defense.126 
 Townsend’s responses were aimed mainly at correcting the record. The Senator described 
these sorts of attacks on his record as “falsehoods and half-truths.”127 Though the Democrats 
were more than happy to sign their name to many of these criticisms, Townsend further argued 
that “unsigned pamphlets” were deliberately falsifying his record in the Senate.128 These attacks 
distressed the campaign so much that it took out a full-page ad in the Sunday Star. Entitled “True 
or False… An Appeal For Fair Play,” the ad set out to contradict nine of the charges Tunnell 
leveled against the senator, including claims that he voted against materials for the national 
defense.129 The “In G.O.P. Ranks” column in the same paper blasts Tunnell for these same 
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comments — describing Tunnell as the “Georgetown mudslinger” and declaring “it was not 
difficult for Senator Townsend to slap politician Jim slaphappy.”130 
 
Victors and Vanquished Alike  
 Delaware’s connection to the presidential race was not limited to the issue of the third 
term. Though Delaware’s three electoral votes were not seen as a major prize, Wilmington’s 
central location between Baltimore and Philadelphia made it a natural stop for the locomotive 
campaigning that characterized national campaigns in this era, and Roosevelt and Willkie each 
made a campaign stop in Delaware within the last two weeks of the campaign. 
 Roosevelt stopped at the train station in Wilmington on October 23 to deliver a very brief 
speech from the back of his campaign trail, an intermediate stop on the way to a later appearance 
in Philadelphia. Appearing with Tunnell, the President endorsed him in one sentence: “I hope 
[Sen. James H. Hughes] will be joined in Washington with another Democratic senator from 
Delaware.”131 Roosevelt’s brief remarks — he stopped for a mere 13 minutes — consisted of a 
paraphrased speech by Abraham Lincoln about the meaning of the word “liberty,” encouraging 
the crowd to choose a positive vision of liberty.132 The speech, with its connections to Lincoln, 
put forward a vision of liberty that would need to be actively defended. 
 Wendell Willkie had a much longer appearance in Delaware, appearing on October 31 
and making a much more extensive appearance. Rather than speaking from his train, Willkie 
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planned a full rally in Rodney Square in downtown Wilmington, an event which drew as many 
as 30,000 people.133 Sources are split on whether this appearance was successful, as the Journal 
Every-Evening praised Willkie’s remarks and dedicated several pages of newsprint to the 
appearance. Carter, though, suggests that Willkie had worn out his vocal cords at this point in the 
campaign and was therefore not a very powerful speaker.134 Willkie offered a brief endorsement 
for Townsend, stating that his presence would be necessary “to help straighten out the mess” in 
Washington.135 Willkie’s most notable comment was to suggest that he would increase American 
production to the point where sending 12,000 planes to Britain would be “insignificant.”136 
Though Townsend actually introduced the candidate, his remarks were deemed so insignificant 
that they did not receive mention in the paper. 
 The campaign came down to the final days, but in the end the strength of the Democratic 
ticket was too much for John Townsend as the voters of Delaware decided to change their 
representation in the Senate. The Journal-Every Evening’s coverage of the Senate contest the 
morning after the election was limited to a one-sentence blurb: “U.S. Senator John G. Townsend, 
Jr., a ranking Republican member of the Senate, was defeated for re-election by Democratic 
National Committeeman James M. Tunnell, Sr., by a vote of 66,471 to 62,908, or a plurality of 
3,563, according to the official count.”137 The same section noted that Republican Rep. George 
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S. Williams was also defeated, losing by 5,229 votes.138 Though the paper had been hyper-
partisan in favor of Willkie and the Republicans during the entire election season, the paper’s 
editorial on Wednesday morning struck a conciliatory tone: “Delaware voters yesterday spoke 
their verdict at the polls. […] Upon victors and vanquished alike rests the responsibility for 
working together without petty partisanship for the welfare of all the people of Delaware.” 
 The reasons for this were severalfold and are apparent from the pattern of the campaign. 
The personal popularity of Roosevelt and the New Deal was very strong in Delaware, seen by 
the ways in which Townsend emphasized his personal integrity rather than his opposition to the 
president. Roosevelt won Delaware by 11,328 votes but Tunnell won by only 4,208, Tunnell 
running well behind Roosevelt.139 This number suggests that Townsend enjoyed great personal 
popularity that persuaded many Roosevelt voters to vote for him. Tunnell and the Democrats 
also ran a ruthless campaign that used Townsend’s record in the Senate against him, using the 
rhetorical framework of preparedness in order to take a Senator largely focused on local concerns 
and fiscal discipline and paint him as a hard-line conservative. It also seems likely that the weak 
campaign of Willkie did the Republican senator no favors. The “no third term” rhetoric, in 
particular, made it challenging for Townsend to argue that his experience was valuable while at 
the same time attacking the President for the same thing. After four decades of public service, 
John Townsend’s career ended in a political trap he could not escape, the victim of forces 
beyond his control.  
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 In the epigraph to this thesis, I juxtaposed two excerpts from Delaware newspapers. The 
first, written right after the outbreak of war in 1939, was from the editorial staff of the Journal-
Every Evening. It argued that America should have no interest in intervening in the war in the 
Europe; “America has no purpose to reform other nations or alter their pattern.”140 Barely more 
than a year later, a father wrote a letter to the editor of the Sunday Star, discussing his son who 
had been drafted. Despite the risk of losing his life, the father approved of what his boy was to 
do. “Events of the past year,” Jack Horner wrote, “show us what to expect from dictator 
controlled countries.”141 These two fragments, put in conversation, represent the rhetorical, 
political, and legislative shifts undergone by the United States in just one short year of war in 
Europe. Though the initial reaction may have been one of isolationism — that this war was 
Europe’s problem — the next fourteen months saw the contours of public debate shift 
dramatically. By the time of the federal election, the United States became a nation girding itself 
for a war, even if it was a war it hoped would never come. 
 Understanding the role of the preparedness framework is essential to understanding this 
transformation, though it is certainly not complete. Preparedness helped reconcile a nation 
struggling with its competing impulses: to stop tyranny abroad but to avoid the loss of fathers 
and sons, to defend democracy but to keep its home soil safe. It offered interventionists a 
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framework with which to justify actions that might otherwise be characterized by a wary public 
as dangerous aggression. Further, it offered isolationists a new target to attempt to analyze, 
arguing (partially correctly) that it was little more than an interventionist cloak. 
 The elections in New York and Delaware reflect the increasing dominance of the 
preparedness framework in discussing the war in Europe. Both interventionist candidates cast 
preparing for war, though not engaging in it, as a responsible, smart response to global 
developments. Mead and Townsend painted their opponents as dangerous ideologues for their 
stances on foreign policy, and were rewarded for it by the electorate. Preparedness became a 
rhetorical code for a serious, responsible public servant. Isolationists were forced to argue 
against a very difficult position, at times accepting the necessity of preparedness while attacking 
other components of their opponents’ record. Isolationists seized on Roosevelt’s run for a third 
term to stoke images of fascism and the end of democracy, but the proposals of the preparedness 
advocates, couched in moderate terms, did not justify these fears to the public. Though it is 
important to remember that the two elections analyzed were case studies and do not represent the 
full scope of the political landscape at the time, they do provide us with solid evidence of the 
rhetorical shifts which characterized the first year of the war in Europe in America. 
 The rhetorical shifts in question must be understood as a part of three broad political 
processes. The changing situation in Europe made Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia seem like 
even greater threats. American public opinion, grappling with new information about the war, 
also evolved in new and unexpected ways. Finally, rhetoric plays an important role as a loose 
gauge of popular opinion by politicians, both reflecting and being shaped by the events around it. 
Changes in rhetoric reflect judgments made about the American political character by 
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contemporary actors, with almost no way of knowing their accuracy except for the harsh, 
imperfect metric of the ballot box.  
Continuing to investigate these rhetorical processes may yield valuable information about 
the Second World War, the foreign policy attitudes of the American public, or how 
representatives attempt to justify their decisions and persuade more citizens to support them. In 
particular, there are two natural extensions to the research which I have conducted here. One is to 
extend the analysis of the preparedness framework through to the first year of the 77th Congress, 
which struggled with similar issues before the United States ultimately joined the war in 
December. Another would be to broaden the scope of this investigation by examining different 
Senate elections in 1940, introducing different regions and different characters to possibly 
complicate the analysis.  
Whatever the way forward might be, investigating the development and influence of the 
preparedness framework is valuable in understanding the processes by which the United States 
came to enter the Second World War. Examining how politicians create, debate, and 
communicate ideas, and how other institutions and citizens respond to and engage with them is a 
valuable way of tracing historical developments and understanding the workings of the 
democratic process. The history of millions of lives turns sometimes on little more than the 
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